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Mortal Knowledge, the Originary Event, 
and the Emergence of the Sacred 
Introduction: Origins 
The question of origins continues to captivate human thought and sentiment, 
despite the postmodern insistence that knowledge of origins is impossible since it must 
lie beyond the boundaries of the origin of knowledge. Knowledge cannot seek causes 
that precede its own existence, it is said. Still, theoretical narratives continue to arise 
accounting for such things as the origin of the universe, of our star and solar system, of 
Earth, of life on the planet, of the human species, of self-aware human cultures, and so 
on down into the origins of the local and particular. This should not be surprising; we 
sense that knowing our origins will tell us who we are. 
Postmodern prohibitions certainly have had no effect on the empirical findings in 
such objective fields as paleoanthropology or palaeoarcheology. The trouble here is that, 
though such objective fieldwork provides significant data, it is only in the interpretation 
of such data that an idea of early human experience can emerge. Interpretation 
inevitably brings in subjective factors and we necessarily find ourselves creating 
scenarios and looking inward into the contexts of the human heart to speculate on the 
prehistoric moment when imagination, conceptual thought, and abstract knowledge 
became possible. In other words, using the tools of our objective sciences, we create 
narratives of origin that attempt to exceed their own limitations by blending the 
objective with the subjective. Generative anthropology embraces such subjectivity and 
tends not to avail itself of such empirical data. It is instead an outstanding example of 
what might be seen as a more literary or even intuitional approach. 
The originary thinking demanded by generative anthropology is to some degree 
anathema to the harder sciences that ignore the human experience to seek progress in 
verifiable knowledge, centrifugally flying from origins even while explaining them away. 
The point of origin, however, remains the centripetal centre of the present for the 
mythic mind, akin to the inspirations of poetry and the arts for us. However, when the 
mythic mind becomes the theoretic mind, according to the stages explained by Donald 
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(1991), sacred awareness becomes self-isolated objectivity, much more efficient but 
entirely without a sense of revelation. 
Originary thinking draws the mind inexorably back toward its origin. It is 
memory as epistrophe  (Hillman, 1979; Nixon, 1995). Individual minds originate within 1
specific cultural contexts, but whence such symbolic cultural contexts in the first place? 
This is the heart of the matter. To fully experience our own conscious existence, both 
psychic and physical, we must have a context, a sense of the circumstances and powers 
that birthed it. As GA founder Eric Gans (1993) pointed out: “We can construct no 
theory of the human that is not grounded on the human necessity that motivates our 
construction” (p. 1). In other words, thinking from or toward our origin is to legitimate 
our existence as thinking beings, as well as perhaps to guide us into the future. 
With this in mind, this particular originary analysis will critically compare some 
of the foundational tenets of generative anthropology with the objective findings of 
palaeoanthropology and linguistics. Furthermore, an originary proposal of my own will 
be tendered. It is hoped my suggestions will serve more to augment than oppose those 
already made by Professor Gans (e.g., 1981, 1990, 1993, 2006). 
In the following sections Gans’s hints at the speciation of humanity and the 
timeframe of the originary event will be compared. Next, brief considerations 0n a 
minimal definition of language will be followed by a look at the suddenness and 
revelatory aspects of its (and our) emergence. But the last section will focus on what I 
see as the true catalyst of the originary event — mortal knowledge, and will require a 
change in tone from the literal-empirical to the literary-theoretical. 
My own proposals certainly meet Gans’s minimal requirements: “An originary 
hypothesis must construct a plausible account of the origin of all that is essentially 
human — including the sacred, the esthetic, desire, and resentment” (1993, p. 3), a 
concise list to which I add the sine qua non of conscious experience, i.e., experience that 
has become conscious to itself, loosely known as self-consciousness, a topic Gans (2006) 
has touched upon. Conscious experience as coetaneous with awakening to the sacred 
has been more fully explored by me elsewhere (Nixon, 2010). 
 an experiential reversion or return to the source via present likeness or replication1
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It should be noted that Gans makes it quite clear that his mentioning of possible 
timelines or places and even his reconstruction of the originary event are secondary to 
his insistence that there was an originary event, in one time and one place: “The 
originary hypothesis per se — that human language, and with it, humanity itself, came 
into being in an event — has a higher logical status than this or any other particular 
version of the originary scene” (1993, p. 9). For Gans the first non-syntactic, non-self-
referentially symbolic speakers were well before H. sapiens – more likely H. Erectus. 
Humanity at some point conceived and birthed itself from the womb of nature, though it 
could never become entirely distinct. With this I profoundly agree, but there are still 
devils to be found in the details. 
Our Emergent Species 
To begin this abbreviated quest, we must first identify that for which we seek 
origins. The origin of the human body has been traced largely through paleo-forensics 
and evolutionary science. Homo sapiens, our biological species, is generally thought to 
have emerged in its “early-modern” form some 100 to 200 kya (thousand years ago) in 
Africa.  We are the only extant hominid species and all humans existing are part of it. 2
There are competing theories for such origins, the most well-known being 
multiregionalism, but they need not concern us here. The question here is focused on a 
later product of the activities of H. sapiens, to wit, complex culture and reflective 
consciousness — knowledge creating humanity, the being who lives to learn and learns 
so it may live.  3
At the point when cultural evolution comes largely to replace biological evolution, 
we may find our quarry. “Man must be defined by his mind” (Gans, 1990, p. 2). What we 
seek here is the origin of the human mind, that is, the abstract space of subjectivity that 
 The earliest known bones at this time seem to be those of the subspecies Homo sapiens idaltu, 2
named by palaeoanthropologist Tim White (White et al., 2003) and dated to approximately 160 
kya. Recently, however, McDougall, Brown, and Fleagle (2005) redated fossil skullcaps from 
Ethiopia originally found by Richard Leakey to 195 kya, though this remains controversial. 
“Mitrochondrial Eve” is in this range, now generally thought to have lived ca. 150 kya 
(Wikipedia, 2006). A forerunner species, archaic H. sapiens, originating as early as 500 kya is 
now widely identified as H. heidelbergensis (Klein, 2004; Tattersall, 1998).
 Famed anthropologist Richard Leakey (1994): “Humans became human through intense 3
learning not just of survival skills but of customs and social mores, kinship and social laws — 
that is, culture. … Culture can be said to be the human adaptation” (p. 45).
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creates knowledge and divides self from world through the binary structures of symbolic 
communication. What is learned is knowledge, and knowledge is always and only a 
symbolic construction (however successful its practical application may be). It is only 
with self-reflective subjectivity that conscious learning (as opposed to unconsciously 
reactive behavioural modification) begins.  
There is little indication in the prehistoric archeological record that this crisis of 
cultural transformation is identical to the original speciation of H. sapiens. Though 
skulls discovered from this period appear to have inner indentations where speech areas 
like Broca’s and Wernicke’s are found in modern brains, and though the pharynx is 
lengthened and the larynx fallen allowing for the greater breath control necessary for 
speech, there is simply no certain evidence of any cultural activities that could be 
unequivocally called symbolically abstract in the first 100,00o years or so of H. sapiens. 
It may well be that the brain had other uses for those areas and that the fallen larynx 
served other purposes than speech, for example, the breath control required of rhythmic 
sound-making or even the increasing demands of non-syntactic protolanguage.  4
(Protolanguage amongst the earliest hominids seems to be what Gans (1999) mistakenly 
considers the origin of language itself, but this could only have been gestural pidgin.) 
Later when the symbolic threshold (Percy, 1975; Deacon, 1997) is crossed, the first 
function of these and other biological adaptations or mutations could have been 
exapted  to meet the demands of newly discovered formal language. Did the advent of 5
formal language result from a later cerebral mutation, continued gradual evolution of 
the brain, or from cultural invention?  
Despite the fact that such an awakening to the symbolic potential of vocalizing 
would necessarily have had significant accompanying neural activity, it is unlikely that 
 Bickerton (1995, 2000) has claimed protolanguage compares with nonsyntactic pidgin; he also 4
sees it as symbolic in the sense of using signs or icons to indicate concrete actualities, what I 
would call representational. In this sense, symbolic interaction has been shown to be possible 
even in trained nonhuman species (e.g., Benson, Greaves, O’Donnell, & Taglialatela, 2002). 
Such indicative protolanguage has certainly worked with mimesis to pass on and preserve the 
templates for stone tool manufacture & fire preservation; however, language as symbolic 
narrative or with symbolic self-reference (cf., Cassirer, 1946; Deacon, 1997) is no longer proto. 
 Exaptation: “Features that arose in one context but were later co-opted for use in 5
another” (Tattersall, 1998, p. 108).
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the symbolic crossing was made possible by a genetic mutation (macro or micro), the 
theory favoured by Klein (2004) and others like Hauser, Chomsky, Fitch (2002), who 
seem unable to accept that cultural breakthroughs could precede biological change. 
There is no evidence of such a mutation ca. 50 kya when Klein posits the symbolic 
revolution; however, at the earlier time of biological speciation physical features appear 
that were previously unknown. Such fortuitous mutations, according to the evidence, 
are likely to have happened a great many millennia before the breakthrough to formal 
human language  and the recognition of the sacred. 6
Certainly an improved ability to communicate in “prehistoric 
pidgin” (protolanguage ) would have proved evolutionarily advantageous. It seems quite 7
sensible to speculate that early-modern H. sapiens began to expand his repertoire of 
mimicry and gesture with a greatly improved ability to make a wider range of oral 
sounds. But whether cerebral capacity increased first or evolved from cultural practices 
passed on through education must remain unknown. Here Gans (1990) is for cultural 
change first: “The hypothetical event involves no immediate biological modification, but 
it promotes such modification by revising the selection criteria within the proto-human 
species to include the supplementary aptitude for survival bestowed by the discovery/
invention of language” (p. 7). This approach is eminently reasonable, though they may 
have co-evolved, as Deacon (1997) would have it.  
In any case, this evolutionary change in the physiology of communication would 
likely allow for some degree of increased cultural complexity over tens of thousands of 
years (specifics varying from tribe to tribe), but at this point such communication would 
have remained but a tool to serve instrumental ends in the here and now. The 
displacement from the here and now, the abstraction of self from world, the power to 
create-discover images and give them form, the sense of a sacred reality — these were 
yet waiting in the wings. 
 Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002) refer to FLB, the faculty of language in the broad sense, 6
that many animals have, and to FLN, the faculty of language in the narrow sense, that only 
humans have. When I speak of formal language or human language throughout, I refer to the 
latter.
 I speculate that protolanguage received major impetus with the early control of fire, an event 7
that provided a more compelling centre for attraction and repulsion than any game animal.
7
On this matter, Professor Gans is ambivalent. On several occasions, he seems to 
equate the emergence of modern humanity with the H. sapiens speciation. While 
making another point, he states, “But the human ethic was more powerful than the pre-
human, and by the time homo sapiens [sic] appeared we must assume that it had driven 
it out” (1990, p. 29). In another work, Gans is even more firm: “The originary hypothesis 
implies that the genetic differentiation of Homo sapiens should result from the new 
selection criteria inaugurated by the use of language; whatever evolutionary pattern, 
genetic changes must follow rather than lead the emergence of cultural 
phenomena” (1993, note p. 4). Elsewhere he speaks of “cultural speciation” (1993, p. 7), 
seemingly accepting the emergence of our self-referential subspecies, yet still equating it 
with our biological parent species. 
Agreed that the subspecies we are seems to be the result of cultural invention; it 
is not functionally or phenomenologically the same species as the early pre-symbolic 
(what Gans might call pre-representational ) early or premodern H. sapiens. We are 8
apparently much the same biologically, though detailed brain scans would likely reveal 
great changes in neuronal assemblies. We have become what was once redundantly 
called Homo sapiens sapiens, humanity that knows that it knows (used in the past, 
however, to refer to the original biological species). The new species or subspecies that 
we are is differentiated by its symbolic communication and culture. Philosopher 
Cassirer (1944) nominated the sobriquet animal symbolicum (p. 26), while novelist 
Percy (1975) called us like he saw us, Homo symbolificus, “humanity the symbol-
monger” (p. 16). Deacon titled us The Symbolic Species (1997), still H. sapiens however. 
No doubt there has been great gain and great loss in becoming the new species that 
Morris (1993) designated as Homo symbolicus in his 1925 dissertation, the Latin term 
probably most appropriate for the species we have become. 
The Timeline of Emergence 
Gans shows bold insight in noting that this change could not have resulted from 
gradual changes, evolutionary or otherwise. It was a sudden and one-time event, though 
anomalies of symbolic engagement are indicated in the archeological record. Just as the 
 though language as representation is problematic, as will be seen below8
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symbolic-linguistic abilities of Kanzi the bonobo (Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin, 1994) and 
Alex the grey parrot (Pepperberg, 2000) are anomalies that seem to resist that desired 
clean line between our language abilities and those of our confreres in the rest of the 
animal kingdom,  so prehistoric archeological discoveries prevent us from drawing an 9
absolute line between a time of no symbolism and that of symbol use. 
Anomalous islands of apparent symbol use have appeared in a number of places, 
but — to judge from the lack of similar evidence in nearby times or places — such 
symbol use did not survive or spread to other human groups so cannot be said to be the 
beginning of the symbolic species. An anomaly is just that, an unclassifiable irregularity, 
but it might be noted that though the symbol-use in these islands is unexplained we 
have no reason to think it implies complex culture and reflective consciousness. 
Henshilwood et al. (2001) found rock incision patterns and the ubiquitous red 
ochre (rust) dating from more than 70 kya at Blombos Cave in South Africa, though 
their symbolic meaning remains mysterious leaving this find as anomalous indeed. The 
Smithsonian states that the “petroglyphs (rock engravings) found at Panaramitee 
[Australia], around 45,000 years old, are the earliest known examples of rock art in the 
world” (Scarre, 1993, p. 45). Stanford anthropologist Klein (2004) names the finding of 
“beads” made from ostrich egg shell fragments in Africa’s Great Rift Valley ca. 50 kya as 
the first indisputable indication of symbolic representation.  The move toward a more 10
recent origin by identifying formal language forms with visual images was given a boost 
by Noble and Davidson (1991, 1996) who made a study of cave art and prehistoric 
sculpture and concluded that languages can be traced back with certainty only about 
32,000 years. The discovery of the Chauvet Cave in France, claiming the oldest known 
paintings in the world at over 30 kya (Chauvet, Deschamps, and Hillaire, 1996), 
supports this and is the first indisputable sign of Pfeiffer’s (1982) creative explosion of 
 It must be noted that the such abilities are not innate but have resulted from extensive training 9
by humans, another indication that language was a cultural creation not a biological accident.
 Since Klein wrote, Nassarius snail shell beads found at the Blombos Cave site in South Africa 10
have been dated at 75 kya, & recently three even older possible shell beads, two found in the 
Skhul Cave site in Israel & one in Algeria, are claimed to originate 90–100 kya (Rincon, 2006). 
There is always a danger to naming an “earliest” date or time period in archeology. This applies 
here, as well.
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the Cro-Magnon in what is now Spain and France. At this point, reflective consciousness 
is on full display in its engagement with sacred reality. 
The time that formal language (FLN) emerged remains a subject of volatile 
dispute with some insisting that nonhuman animals have languages of their own, others 
following a gradualist evolutionary scenario (e.g., Greenspan & Shanker, 2004; Pinker, 
1994), but with the major debate between those of the early and late schools of suddenly 
appearing formal language. There is not the space to consider the arguments here, but 
suffice to say that amongst the objective data-based community (e.g., Bickerton, 2000; 
Deacon, 1997), the early origins (100+ kya, sometimes including Neanderthal or even H. 
erectus) holds ascendancy, with the more artistically-attuned group (e.g., Klein, 2004; 
Noble & Davidson, 1991, 1996; Pfeiffer, 1982; Tattersall, 1998, 2002) seeing late origins, 
30-50 kya. 
Earlier burials of early H. sapiens have been found in Israel ca. 100 kya but the 
“ritual remains” (boar jawbone and deer antlers) are scant and open to interpretation, 
according to Ian Tattersall (1998), Curator in the Department of Anthropology of the 
American Museum of Natural History — not to mention the fact that they are alone in 
that time period, that is, anomalous. No unequivocal evidence of symbolic grave 
remains appears in the record until the extravagant Cro-Magnon burial found in what is 
now European Russia 28 kya.  By this period, the mythic mind of modern humans  11 12
clearly makes itself evident, as Tattersall proclaims: “Nothing like this appears in the 
record left by any earlier humans. Truly, a new kind of being was on Earth” (p. 10). 
 Some few Neanderthal burials have indeed taken place but none have yet been located that 11
contain the sorts of weapons, tools, food items, or ornamentation that might be thought to be 
useful to the deceased in the afterlife. The famous Neanderthal “flower burial” of Shanidar IV 
has been convincingly repudiated in the Cambridge Archaeological Journal (Sommer, 1999) as 
the result of natural causes. The shallowness of other burials and the space-saving postures 
could reasonably be interpreted as the simplest means of disposing of corpses that soon become 
unpleasant company. Tattersall (1998) concludes that “it is difficult to sustain the notion that 
Neanderthal burial represented symbolic activity, as opposed to the simple expression of grief 
and loss” (p. 161).
 Donald (1991) differentiates the episodic cognition of infrahumans from the mimetic 12
cognition of hominid prehumans, and the mythic mind of the first true humans who were yet 
premodern. The modern mind he calls theoretic, i.e., analytic and objective, built around the 
mythic mind.
10
Though Professor Gans (1999) has stated his preference for an early origin of 
language, he is referring to what he calls the “little bang” of the first representational 
gesture, symbolic in that it indicates a state of mind. Such singular gestures without a 
syntactical system are conceivable within what has been called protolanguage, but such 
singular representations would still be restricted to the here and now and thus not able 
to open the communal mind to the beyondness of the sacred. I would think the 
centrality of aesthetics alone would lead GA to identifying the originary event with the 
late appearance of this new kind of being on Earth. 
Language and Representation 
Tattersall is also in agreement with Professor Gans that this change was not 
gradual. However, there is no reason it could not be piecemeal and gradual if Gans’s 
version of the originary event were accepted. Gans suggests a “thought experiment” in 
which a tribe surrounds an object of appetite, like a game animal. But when the 
members of the group approach the object simultaneously, they become aware of the 
conflict about to ensue over possession of the game. One of them gestures or vocally 
expostulates indicating the refusal to continue the approach and, for Gans, this is the 
first meaningful sign to see the light of day: 
The aborted gesture of the individuals on the periphery, which is prolonged in the 
kinetic imagination of each toward the object, becomes the sign of the object. The 
reproduction of this sign not only evokes the object but designates it to the other 
participants of the scene. This gesture is thus the first act of representation.  13
(1990, p. 3) 
In this scenario, there’s no reason such a singular “sign” could not appear 
spontaneously in other places then gradually evolve among many groups into the 
greater complexity of full-blown language. The problem with this approach is that 
individual signs that re-present an external object are not widely accepted as the basis 
for formal language. Such signs — verbal or gestural “symbolic” indicators — are instead 
the fundamental components of protolanguage (Bickerton, 2000) that, once established, 
 My difference from Gans here may be terminological, depending on what he intends by 13
representation. Ambiguously, he also states that language need not re-present external reality: 
“Since language makes things appear, there is no need for the appearance it evokes to 
correspond with reality” (1990 p. 22).
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are passed on and changed through mimesis.  However, Gans has also claimed that the 14
sign is experienced as emerging from the centre, implying that it is a sort of global 
representation within the complete context of a language that is present as potential but 
yet unformed. 
The semantic keys to human speech (and intersubjective human being) are image 
reception, symbolic self-reference, and narrative wherein symbols of language and other 
creative systems expand the system by going forth as imaginal realities, i.e., 
experienced images. Symbolic self-reference — symbols deriving meaning from a 
symbolic matrix (and, later, speech with a subjective referent) — is not necessarily 
enclosed within the garrote of the hermeneutic circle, but instead with image-
receptivity (imagination) is concentrically open. The image, always one step ahead, 
keeps the concept open and intentional. The inherent syntactic creativity of most human 
sentences and the symbolic reference to images or ideas (not representations) are 
enough to set human language apart from all other modes of communication. 
Linguist Trask (1995) offers four further closely related “design features” of the 
FLN, modified from Hockett’s (1960) famous list, and demonstrates that only human 
language has them: duality, “the use of a small number of meaningless elements in 
combination to produce a large number of meaningful elements” (p. 3); displacement 
and open-endedness (too closely related to separate), the former the ability “to talk 
about things other than the here and now” (p. 5), and the latter the fact that nearly 
anything can be said.  A corequisite of these two is another kind of displacement, that 15
of the speaker from the spoken, though for the first speakers such displacement would 
have been subliminal at best. The last is stimulus-freedom, the power to choose how or 
if one should respond to a received stimulus. Trask concludes: “Lacking duality, lacking 
displacement, lacking open-endedness, lacking stimulus-freedom, animal signalling 
systems are almost unfathomably different from human languages” (p. 11). 
 Donald (1991) notes that “mimesis is fundamentally different from imitation and mimicry in 14
that it involves the invention of intentional representations. When there is an audience to 
interpret the action, mimesis also serves the purpose of social communication” (p. 169).
 Benson et al. (2002) claim Kanzi demonstrates these; perhaps, albeit in a highly restricted 15
manner. Semantic creativity requires that the whole constructive system be active: a change in 
quality or kind, not degree.
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The meaningful aspect of language is semantics, and the study of attributing 
meaning to signs within a cultural context is semiotics. But without the spur of the 
semantic imagination as seen in mythic images and narratives — the symbol’s 
compelling just out of reach aspect of felt meaning — language would have no semiotic 
context; it would be just uninspired technology. 
Hermeneutic philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1967) has emphasized the centripetal 
power of the symbol to focus inchoate experience into that which can spoken — that is, 
the first words without concrete referents, the step out of protolanguage into the real 
thing. Referring to the sense of unseen, felt presences, Ricoeur declares that “for these 
realities to be a symbol is to gather together at one point a mass of significations which, 
before giving rise to thought, give [sic] rise to speech” (p. 11). Speech together precedes 
speech alone (monologues), which in turn precedes silent inner speech (thought), often 
considered necessary for selfhood. It appears that intersubjective symbolic exchange 
precedes the individual sense of self. It is the communally accepted meaning of symbols 
that gives language wings, that is, its imaginal potential to expand into the unknown, to 
build palaces of imagination where before had been nothing — yet these palaces are of 
uncontestable reality since their existence is experienced by all members of the dialogic 
group, often no doubt as revelations, a perspective generative anthropology should find 
amenable. 
Language — in the Saussurean sense of the play of signs and, beyond that, since 
almost anything can be said or thought — cannot begin its ventures into the abstract 
until a complete network of syntactic structures is in place. Without such foundational 
structures, ideas or concepts cannot be combined or spliced (Chomsky’s merge and 
displace) to create new ideas or concepts that make no direct reference to the concrete 
world of the embodied senses or the environment. This explains why there are no partial 
languages (proto does not mean partial) since, for abstract concepts to have meaning, 
they must already be embedded within a larger meaningful system. How else could ideas 
or words employ other ideas and words to build new ideas and words? 
Pointer names or signs that only indicate concrete objects or actions in the here 
and now can never get off the ground, so to speak, that is, they cannot create new 
sentences from the organs of previous sentences to expand on a theme or tell a story. If 
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partial FLNs are not possible, than a self-referential language code or system cannot be 
built bit-by-bit. It must begin as an emergent system already functional with the 
potential for expansion. Such emergence can only take place all at once, in a 
momentous efflorescence, as the next section elaborates. 
The Originary Moment 
 To discover a mythic cosmos and tell its story meant that the syntactic 
undercarriage already had to be present as a complete system. You cannot build a 
cosmology with a partial syntactic structure any more than you could build a bridge 
without a consistent structural support system. The various properties that in a 
momentary concrescence created recursive syntax may have been evolving for millions 
of years each on their own but in the service of other biological functions. 
Metaphorically, the parts of the bridge may have been made elsewhere then combined 
to make its structural support system. Until the entire bridge is complete, however, it is 
useless. Only with a complete bridge can the crossing be made, and that completion 
occurs in a single identifiable moment. In the same way, human recursive speech cannot 
appear until its substructure is in place, and that appearance arrives suddenly. Unlike 
the bridge, formal language is an emergent, its possibilities not indicated in its 
substructure. Language in the human sense is not reducible to its parts. 
 This then is a first point that needs emphasis: Even if the journey to this 
transformation of experience is seen as a slow rising exponential curve, there is still an 
apex, the point of transition. No matter how slow or long the climb up the hill, no matter 
how many returns, pauses, dead ends, or turns toward other hills to ascend, this 
particular hill is only crested once — in a moment — for the first time. This has been 
noted by any number of linguists and theorists of the symbolic but is usually mentioned 
as an aside, as though the very idea was too bold to bear scrutiny. 
 Structuralists begin with the assumption that language creates a parallel reality of 
its own. Anthropologist Lévi Strauss has stressed that “language could only have been 
born in a single stroke. Objects couldn’t just start to signify progressively. After a 
transformation … a passage was effected from a stage where nothing made sense to 
another where everything did” (in Kristeva, 1989, p. 46).  
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Chomsky has avoided questions to do with the evolution of language but has 
recently (2002) intimated that the innate universal grammar that enables all formal 
languages could not have gradually evolved but might have resulted from a sudden 
neural mutation. Linguistics scholar Bickerton (1995) agrees with the mutational theory 
and further declares that “a wide range of evidence ... has suggested that the evolution of 
syntax was ... likely a single catastrophic event” (p. 82).  What other source could there 16
be for humanity’s discovery of open-ended syntax?  
 Like Tattersall, the Johansons (1994) see that symbolic art, language, and 
conceptual cognition are evolutionarily simultaneous. The Johansons quote the 
Australian archeologist and aboriginal cave explorer Rhys Jones as agreeing with the 
suddenness of the awakening of our species: “My guess is that we will very quickly be 
able to establish that early on, whatever early is, the whole lot was there. Bang. They 
were us. And before that they weren’t us; they were something different. Then 
something decisive happened” (p. 306). 
So the saltational explanation has wide if low-key support. Aside from it being a 
statistical long-shot, none of the above sources offer much against the lucky mutation 
theory. Gans, as noted, sees language as a cultural invention and others agree, though 
their explanations range variously through the need to maintain monogamous bonds, 
the territorial imperative, the gossip imperative, the diplomatic imperative, the 
demands of climate change, the rise of shamanism, or the campfire braggadocio of 
successful hunters. For Gans, the immediate cause seems to have been breakthrough 
foresight and a crisis of conscience with no precursor or accompanying biological 
change. It was all in the mind, it seems, or mind was then immaculately conceived.  
We argue today over the relative influences of mind and body or nature and 
culture; however, I would suggest that at the time of the originary event no such 
distinction was yet possible. The world experienced as out there and mind in here could 
only have come after the awakening of conscious experience, though the schism between 
self and world was probably not complete until the era of analytic objectivity.  
 There is certainly disagreement with this among linguists. Pinker (1994) stays with 16
incremental evolution; Kristeva (1989) agrees with the timeline here but suggests that the 
graphic image preceded the vocal; Hagège (1990) postulates a multiregional language origin in 
which speech was discovered in various times and places by humans — thus no first language.
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There is one suggestion that calls upon both biological (though not necessarily 
mutational) resources and cultural-psychological necessity. If a prehuman group 
achieved such development in protolinguistic communication that they enjoyed a kind 
of emotional bond unknown to earlier tribal units, they would undergo the stress of 
environmental or other life maintenance challenges as a simpatico unit. Such 
functional/emotional communication as an extension of the mother-infant bond is in 
fact seen as the precursor and foundation of formal language in an important work by 
Greenspan and Shanker (2004) who present a strong case against the necessity for any 
sort of innate Chomskyian language acquisition device (LAD). If a crisis of such 
magnitude arose in the lives of these emotionally bonded prehumans that their 
continued existence was thrown into doubt, it is conceivable that the evolutionary 
imperative of survival at all costs could have called forth whatever fundamental 
biological resources were available to meet the needs of the situation. Even if the crisis 
were the result of cultural interaction or fledgling cognition, hopeless paralysis in 
response would be both a mental (emotional) and physical impairment. 
Such a psychological-biological transformation may not be as extraordinary as it 
sounds. In supporting their fortuitous mutation hypothesis, Hauser, Chomsky, and 
Fitch (2002) note that “the human faculty of language appears to be organized exactly 
like the genetic code itself: hierarchical, generative, recursive, and virtually limitless 
with respect to its scope of expression” (p. 1569). But there’s no need to assume 
mutation: The originary moment may be the organism’s natural response to humanity’s 
first cognitive crisis, a crisis so profound that the organism was thrown back upon its 
elemental biological resources. The genetic code could well have been the template for 
the creation of an entirely new response system; it could have been replicated by 
bringing to mind syntactic structures to meet an overwhelming semantic emergency. 
The Existential Crisis  17
The first speakers, I have suggested, could only have spoken a meaningful word 
or made a meaningful sign in the context of a larger semiotic, i.e., a meaning-making 
system. Even if syntactic possibility had been called forth, there could not have yet 
 This section is necessarily a condensation of ideas better developed elsewhere (Nixon, 2010).17
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existed isolated centres of subjectivity, that is, reflective selves, to speechify or more 
likely tell a story. There was as yet no sense of oneself as a mind that imagines and 
creates images or asserts words and tells a story. The images to provide a semiotic 
context would have been experienced as arriving from parts unknown, as communal 
revelation, even as the words to conjure them were laboriously brought forth. 
Why would a group of emotionally bonded prehumans need to put their heads 
together and literally come to terms with their situation? What does narrative provide 
that was so essential to their continued existence? As the study of very early or 
rudimentary primitive myth indicates, the first myths are not linear “just so stories”, 
explaining to a people who they are, the origins for everything from the mundane to the 
grandiose, and providing ethical guidelines. Mythic narratives at this stage do not have a 
clear beginning, middle, and end but instead are cyclical (Eliade, 1954). Their purpose, 
as far as they can be said to have one, is still emotional, not expository, and associated 
with ritual enough to magically call forth hidden powers that will protect the people by 
confirming the sanctity of their existence.  With this, Gans (1993) seems to be in 18
agreement: “The origin of language is the revelation of God” (p. 42). I might add that 
our term “God” can be traced back to the Indo-European “gheu(e)-” meaning to call or 
invoke (Claiborne, 1989).  
The images received as revelation, simultaneously conjured by spellbound 
phrases, awaken a new reality, the dimension of the sacred. The working out of the first 
syntactically arranged phrases and sentences from the flotsam and jetsam of 
protolinguistic pidgin  would have taken the form of narrative, though the first 19
narrative must have been a painful birth indeed, involving numbers of people struggling 
together to form concepts. 
 “Myth is a form of poetry which transcends poetry in that it proclaims a truth; a form of 18
reasoning which transcends reasoning in that it wants to bring about the truth it proclaims; a 
form of action, of ritual behaviour, which does not find its fulfillment in the act but must 
proclaim and elaborate a poetic form of myth” (Frankfort & Frankfort, 1946, p. 16). Also see 
Cassirer, 1946.
 This is not far-fetched as cases of second generation pidgin speakers suddenly speaking in the 19
formal structures of creole indicate (see Bickerton, 1983). 
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The purpose of these first rudimentary narratives, employing syntactical 
formations heretofore unknown, was to create meaning. Syntax emerged to meet the 
need for semantics. The concepts and the images that accompanied such stories were to 
make meaningful the people’s lives by opening up vistas beyond the immediacy of 
senses. Since narrative is meaning-making, the obvious question is, why was meaning-
making necessary? And the obvious answer is that these first people were undergoing a 
crisis of absolute meaninglessness.  
Such existential angst may seem anachronistic, but despite the cliché I suggest 
that’s exactly what was occurring. These people’s functional-emotional communications 
in protolanguage had at last brought them to the brink where the obvious was 
inescapable: Everybody dies. No matter how stable the cultural arrangements, no 
matter how good the hunting, at some point it must have become overwhelmingly 
obvious that life loses: Decline, death, and decay come to all — even to loved ones, even 
to Great Leader, even to me. This last one would likely be the tipping point since at that 
point mortal knowledge ceases to be an objective observation but becomes instead a 
subjective brick wall — the first sense of oneself as a subjective entity yet also an object 
of limited duration in the world. 
Personal death, however, cannot be conceived. It is beyond the horizon of 
experience. The fear that seems to arise over such an absolute unknown may well be 
more the horror of losing the world and its primary context, the body. “[Can we say that] 
the terror of death is a substitute for the terror of world-ending?” Crapanzano (2004) 
asks. “Is it less our own dissolution than that of the world — our intimate and perduring 
connection with it — that terrifies us? The most frightening of nightmares is to be 
absolutely alone — deprived of all context, human or material” (p. 202). 
Mortal knowledge then is the unbearable negation of all life striving. Since death 
in itself cannot be conceived it may be understood as the absent-presence (to borrow a 
phrase from the deconstructionists) around which mythic narratives and images 
circulate. It is the reason for narrative, yet its aporia. Since meaning is only intended 
but never completely arrived at via narrative or image, death may be understood as the 
lacuna within it, but it is this lacuna that gives storytelling its impetus. “The storyteller 
has borrowed his authority from death,” literary theorist Walter Benjamin (1969) 
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declared. Death “imparts to everything that concerned him that authority which even 
the poorest wretch in dying possesses for the living around him. This authority is at the 
very source of the story” (p. 94). 
If this existential crisis seems strained, one need only consider the sad cases of 
many wild animals that have been taken from the wild to live out their lives in cages. 
Often their will to live simply ebbs away and their actual lives soon follow. 
 In same way, the flow of nonconscious experience hits the brick wall of mortal 
knowledge. The flow ceases. The life instinct recoils back upon itself in despair.  20
Experience becomes conscious to itself as mourning (a word with the same root as 
memory). The sense of a self-in-time is born under the auspices of dread.  
Then at that dark hour a turning point:  The innate image-making power behind 
perception combines with procedural memory to call forth the polar opposite of the end 
of time — time’s beginning, the epistrophe of re-experienced creation. Through ananke, 
absolute necessity, the group members begin to call forth the verbal concepts and 
accompanying images of their origin and identity. They haltingly speak of things unseen 
and concepts proliferate into narratives. The time of origins is re-experienced in this 
moment when a leap of imagination calls forth the recursive displacement available in 
the genetic code and linguistic syntax is employed for the first time. Their hesitant, 
spellbound narrative takes them beyond concrete immediacy into the realms of the 
sacred. And the time of beginnings is begun all over again — for the first time, of course. 
Or so it seems to me anyway. It may say something about the unspeakable power 
of the knowledge of personal death that so little has been written about mortal 
knowledge as a formative concept in the history of philosophy until recently. 
Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927) dove into it, along the way fulfilling the cultural 
need to, if not defeat death, at least obscure or finesse it. Later existentialists often 
seemed to embrace mortal knowledge and accept the absurdity of life-striving as a 
result, but they were stuck in self-isolation.  
Psychoanalysis has likewise either discovered a death wish or seen such a wish as 
the fear of life. Why the fear of life? N.O. Brown (1959) indicated it was because of 
 The implied meaning of my book title, The Coil of Time and the Recoil of Memory (1995).20
19
sexual repression and the failure to come to terms with death. Becker (1973) agrees: 
“The irony of man’s condition is that the deepest need is to be free of the anxiety of 
death and annihilation; but it is life itself which awakens it, and so we must shrink from 
being fully alive” (p. 66). Yet without mortal knowledge, we would never have crossed 
the symbolic threshold, never have experienced the originary moment, never created 
language and culture. Becker proclaims that as the result of its need to deny death 
cultural humanity has benefitted: 
Man has a symbolic identity that brings him sharply out of nature. He is a 
symbolic self, a creature with a name, a life history. He is a creator with a mind 
that soars out to speculate about atoms and infinity, who can place himself 
imaginatively at a point in space and contemplate bemusedly his own planet. This 
immense expansion, this dexterity, this ethereality, this self-consciousness gives 
to man literally the status of a small god in nature. (p. 26) 
That this is an especially fertile area of speculation for understanding ourselves is 
made clear when we appreciate that this existential crisis was concomitant upon the 
also dawning awareness of oneself as a unique experiencing entity. The thought that 
death is unavoidable implies a corollary: I have a life that will end: I … am! Indeed, the 
two must be impossibly entwined in origin: One feels the wonder of becoming conscious 
of oneself as an existing, experiencing being and of others as similar such beings even as 
the wonder of the moment is umbered by its cause. Death makes life real. One realizes 
that one is a living entity the moment the dark mirror of death forces such a reflection 
upon us. Self consciousness is the polarity of death consciousness, each inside the other: 
The self is founded with death at its core.  
As the ultimate origin of language, religion, art, ethics, and all higher cognition, it 
seems to be true after all that, as Wallace Stevens (1923/54) famously wrote in “Sunday 
Morning”: 
Death is the mother of beauty; hence from her, 
Alone, shall come fulfilment to our dreams 
And our desires. (V: 3-5) 
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In Conclusion 
Again, this is not an attempt to claim that generative anthropology’s originary 
hypothesis is wrong and mine is right. In fact, it appears they are two different theories. 
Gan’s theory involves the origin of the gestural protolanguage that accompanied tool-
making and was necessary to pass on the templates for doing do. These early hominids 
would likely recognize the reality of death but would be unable to conceive of its 
inevitability or of their own mortality. It follows therefore that they were unable to 
objectively recognize (conceive of) their own temporal existence. They were not yet self-
aware, but the threshold crossing into gestural pidgin may have allowed for some sense 
of personal existence and thus vulnerability beyond that of the animal. Indeed, it is 
conceivable that the cause of the big breakthrough for Gans’s pre-human troop of 
hunters that allowed them to resist the natural instinct to “appropriate” was fear of 
individual death. Even without self-knowledge or awakening to the sacred, fear, not 
morality, would be the prime mover. The others would pick up on this abnegation both 
because they too had an inkling of personal vulnerability and because they were 
mimetically in tune with what was occurring. This implies that fear and the imperative 
to deny its everpresent cause are at the heart of all social and ethical codes. 
Professor Gans has not found establishing a timeline or comparing the objective 
finds of palaeoanthropological excavations to be germane to his purpose, though it 
seems clear he is referencing a time when our ancestors first became dependent on 
stone tools. According to him, the originary event that took place only once at a 
particular place and time, which ironically matches how I see the crossing of the 
symbolic threshold taking place, hundreds of thousands of years later. Stronger support 
has been given to the unprecedented suddenness of the crossing of the symbolic 
threshold than is possible for the originary event so far back in time is its. Symbolic 
speech, however, would likely have spread to other tribal groups like the wildfire of a 
charismatic religious movement, so effective and wondrous was it found to be. 
At this point, my only hesitation against a very ancient originary event leading to 
to a gestural protolanguage is that a single word or gesture, no matter what its ostensive 
or spontaneous character may be, is impossible to accept as the origin of language in the 
formal sense I have elucidated. Professor Gans might not be disposed to reject such 
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suggestions out of hand since he too agrees that language and symbolic culture could 
only have arisen as a communal phenomenon. So one person’s aborted gesture does not 
a language make. Furthermore, he understands that language is metaphoric and thus 
opens the door to imagination, abstract conceptions, liminal presences, or the hidden 
beyond of the sacred: “The process of virtualization, whereby human culture is extended 
beyond the possibilities of face-to-face contact, is inherent in the very existence of 
language” (1993, p. 18). 
 The generative anthropology hypothesis as is provides more positively-founded 
moral guidelines than mere denial of death, though the present thesis has significant 
moral implications, too, as it indicates fear is at the core of all morality (though not 
necessarily all moral acts) as well as the core of all sacred belief systems, mythic or 
otherwise, a statement with which psychoanalysis would likely agree.  
 But the aborted gesture of appropriation alone does not seem potent enough to 
explain the tremendous awakening to the sacred our forbears must have undergone with 
the actual symbolic crossing and awakening to the sacred world imagined beyond our 
senses within the last 100 thousand years. Only the metaphoric death of the prehuman 
animal in its instinctual paradise and the fall into the emotional paralysis of despair 
could account for the (re)birth of the freely thinking H. symbolicus in a new world of the 
sacred, “walking warm onto the fields of praise”, to paraphrase poet Dylan Thomas 
(1946/71). This may be to wax more flowery than is appropriate, considering how the 
sacred realm has become the mere knowledge generated by the scientific vision of 
Pascal’s nightmare: the vast, cold, mainly empty expanse of objective materiality. 
References 
Becker, E. (1973). The Denial of Death. New York: The Free Press. 
Benjamin, W. (1969). The storyteller. In H. Arendt (Ed.), Illuminations (pp. 83-109), 
trans. H. Zone. New York: Schocken. 
Benson, J., Greaves, W., O’Donnell, M., & Taglialatela, J. (2002). Evidence for symbolic 
language processing in a bonobo (Pan paniscus). Journal of Consciousness Studies 
9 (12): 33-56. 
Bickerton, D. (1983). Pidgin and creole languages. Scientific American 249 (1): 116-122. 
22
Bickerton, D. (1995). Language and Human Behavior. Seattle: U of Washington Press. 
Bickerton, D. (2000). How protolanguage became language. In C. Knight, M. Studdert-
Kennedy, & J.R. Hurford (Eds.), The Evolutionary Emergence of Language (pp. 
264-284). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge U Press. 
Brown, N.O. (1959). Life Against Death. Middleton, CT: Wesleyan U Press. 
Cassirer, E. (1944). An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human 
Culture. New Haven/London: Yale U Press. (Copyright renewed 1972, H. Cassirer 
& A. Applebaum.) 
Cassirer, E. (1946). Language and Myth, trans. S.K. Langer. New York: Dover. 
Chauvet, J-M., Deschamps, É.B., & Hillaire, C. (1996). Dawn of Art: The Chauvet Cave, 
trans. P. G. Bahn. New York: Abrams. 
Chomsky, N. (2002). On Nature and Language. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge U Press. 
Claiborne, R. (1989). The Roots of English: A Reader’s Handbook of Word Origins. 
New York: Anchor-Doubleday. 
Crapanzano, V. (2004). Imaginative Horizons. Chicago: U of Chicago Press. 
Deacon, T. (1997). The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and the Brain. 
New York: Norton. 
Donald, M. (1991). Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of 
Culture and Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard U Press. 
Eliade, M. (1954). The Myth of the Eternal Return: Or, Cosmos and History, trans. 
W.R. Trask. Princeton: Princeton U Press. Original in French 1949. 
Frankfort, H. & Frankfort, H.A. (1949). Myth and reality. In H. & H. A. Frankfort, J. A. 
Wilson, & T. Jacobsen, Before Philosophy: The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient 
Man: An Essay on Speculative Thought in the Ancient Near East (pp. 11-36). 
Baltimore: Penguin. 
Gans, E. (1981). The Origin of Language: A Formal Theory of Representation. 
Berkeley: U of California Press. 
Gans, E. (1990). Science and Faith: The Anthropology of Revelation. Savage, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
Gans, E. (1993). Originary Thinking: Elements of Generative Anthropology. Stanford: 
Stanford U Press. 
23
Gans, E. (1999). The little bang: The early origin of language. Anthropoetics: The 
Journal of Generative Anthropology V (1). Online: http://www.humnet.ucla.edu/
humnet/anthropoetics/ap0501/gans.htm 
Gans, E. (accessed 2006). A brief introduction to generative anthropology. Online: 
http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu/gaintro.htm 
Greenspan, S.I., & Shanker, S.G. (2004). The First Idea: How Symbols, Language, and 
Intelligence Evolved from Our Primate Ancestors to Modern Humans. Cambridge, 
MA: Da Capo. 
Hagège, C. (1990). The Dialogic Species, trans. S.L. Shelley. New York: Columbia U 
Press. Original in French 1985. 
Hauser, M., Chomsky, N., & Fitch, W.T. (2002). The faculty of language: What is it, who 
has it, and how did it evolve? Science 298: 1569-1579. 
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson. New York: 
Harper & Row. Original in German 1927. 
Henshilwood, C., Sealy, J., Yates, R., Cruz-Uribe, K., Goldberg, P., Grine, F.E., Klein, 
R.G., Poggenpoel, C., van Niekerk, K., & Watts, I. (2001). Blombos cave, Southern 
Cape, South Africa: Preliminary report on the 1992-1999 excavations of the Middle 
Stone Age levels. Journal of Archeological Science 28 (4): 421-448. 
Hillman, J. (1979). The Dream and the Underworld. New York: Harper & Row. 
Hockett, C.F. (1960). The origin of speech. Scientific American 203 (3): 88-96. 
Johanson, D. & Johanson, L., with B. Edgar (1994). Ancestors: In Search of Human 
Origins. (Companion Volume to the Nova video Series.) New York: Random 
House. 
Klein, R.G., with B. Edgar (2004). The Dawn of Human Culture. New York: John Wiley 
& Sons. 
Kristeva, J. (1989). Language the Unknown: An Initiation into Linguistics, trans. A.M. 
Menke. New York: Columbia U Press). Original in French 1981. 
Leakey, R. (1994). The Origin of Humankind. New York: Basic Books. 
McDougall, I., Brown, F.H., & Fleagle, J.G. (2005). Stratigraphic placement and age of 
modern humans from Kibish, Ethiopia. Nature 433: 733-736. 
24
Morris, C.W. (1993). Symbolism and Reality: A Study in the Nature of Mind, reprint#3. 
Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1925, original. 
Symbolik und Realitat, reprint#2, introduction & trans. A. Eschbach. Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 1981.) 
Nixon, G. Mercurius (1995). The Coil of Time and the Recoil of Memory. Bragg Creek, 
AB: Makyo.  
Nixon, G. (2010). Myth and mind: The origin of human consciousness in the discovery 




Noble, W. & Davidson, I. (1991). The evolutionary emergence of modern human 
behaviour: Language and its archeology. Man 26: 223-253. 
Noble, W. & Davidson, I. (1996). Human Language, Evolution, and Mind: A 
Psychological and Archeological Inquiry. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge U Press. 
Pepperberg, I.M. (2000). The Alex Studies: Cognitive and Communicative Abilities of 
Grey Parrots. Cambridge MA: Harvard U Press. 
Percy, W. (1975). The Message in the Bottle. New York: Noonday. 
Pfeiffer, J.E. (1982). The Creative Explosion: An Inquiry into the Origins of Art and 
Religion. New York: Harper & Row. 
Pinker, S. (1994). The Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates Language. New York: 
William Morrow. 
Ricoeur, P. (1967). The Symbolism of Evil, trans. E. Buchanan. Boston: Beacon. 
Rincon, P. (June 22, 2006). Study reveals “oldest jewellery”. BBC News Online. 
Savage-Rumbaugh, S. & Lewin, R. (1994). Kanzi: The Ape at the Brink of the Human 
Mind. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Scarre, C. (Ed.) (1993). Smithsonian Timelines of the Ancient World: A Visual 
Chronology from the Origins of Life to AD 1500. New York: Dorling-Kindersley. 
Sommer, J.D. (1999). The Shanidar IV “flower burial”: A reevaluation of Neanderthal 
burial ritual. Cambridge Archaeological Journal 9: 127-129. 
25
Stevens, W. (1954). The Collected Poems. New York: Vintage. Copyright renewed 1982, 
H. Stevens. “Sunday Morning” originally in Harmonium, 1923. 
Tattersall, I. (1998). Becoming Human: Evolution and Human Uniqueness. San Diego: 
Harvest/Harcourt Brace. 
Tattersall, I. (2002). The Monkey in the Mirror: Essays on the Science of What Makes 
Us Human. New York: Harcourt Brace. 
Thomas, D. (1971). Collected Poems of Dylan Thomas 1934-1952. New York: New 
Directions. “Fern Hill” originally 1946. 
Trask, R.L. (1995). Language: The Basics. London & New York: Routledge. 
White, T.D., Asfaw, B., DeGusta, D., Gilbert, H., Richards, G.D., Suwa, G., & Howell, 
F.C. (2003). Pleistocene Homo sapiens from Middle Awash, Ethiopia. Nature 423: 
742-747. 
Wikipedia (accessed 2006). Mitochondrial Eve. Online.
